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our strategic communications practices tend to build on one another in contributing to the widely noted and contin uing decline in US soft power. First
is the problem of inattention to audiences. By neglecting them as we prosecute the
war on terrorism, the war of ideas seems to swell more with critics and combatants

than allies. Second, recent approaches to strategic communications tend to emphasize process and consistency in uniting messages, but the role of the national
executive in achieving convergence may be more crucial. That is, sending identical
or even reinforcing messages may not be as important as making sure that the messages are consistent with audience expectations about US policy. Third, Department of State (DoS) financing for public diplomacy has increased only
increm entally, if that, while the Department of Defense (000 ) weight in the total
flo w of strategic communications, as in foreign policy generally, seems to have escalated along with its b udget. The continuing deterioration of opinion suggests
that the mix of communications is not working, and it certainly contradicts expert
advice on the resources needed for public diplomacy.
Finally, the growing concern about the militarization of US foreign policy may
reflect the rejection of the "military as messenger" for the United States, even if
" Visiting Professor-Practitioner oflnternational Relations, University of the Pacific, Stockton,
California.
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civilians actually make the policy. The US afftrmation of the preemptive use of
force puts the military at the forefron t of US strategic policy, just as the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq have overwhelmed and tended to color the perception about
the rest of our policy. Thus, the increasingly dominant role and resource endowment of DoD in strategic communications might actually worsen the impact on US
soft power. While general flaws in US policy and deficiencies in the work of DoS
may also contribute to the deterioration of America's international image, recent
experience suggests that DoD dominance of strategic communications, and of foreign policy in general, may be increasingly responsible fo r the deterioration of US
international standing.

Opin ions of the United States and American Soft Power
Continue to Decline Together
Notwithstanding the global outpouring of sympathy for the United States following the September 11, 200 1, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, many observers noted a downturn in public support for the United
States during 2002 that reflected widespread deterioration in opinions of the
United States. The Pew Research Center for People and the Press reported in December 2002 that images of the United States had become increasingly tarnished
in the publics of NATO allies, former East European nations, developing nations
and especially Muslim nations and on a variety of dimensions.] That report went
on to detail how pluralities had become critical of American unilateralism, but
this did not extend to rejection, except in Muslim nations, of the approach the
Un ited States was taking to the war on terrorism . On the other hand, the report
was prescient in recognizing that a potential war with Iraq might "further fuel
anti-American sentiment."
As the Pew Center expected, important policy actions, such as the invasion of
Iraq, apparently caused a further deterioration in opinions of the United States. Attitudes, even among allied nations, toward the US approach to the war on
terrorism also t urned sharply negative, and despite some break in the trend during
2005, the overall slide in global opinion of the United States continued to worsen
and spread. 2 Of course, this is a heavily nuanced phenomenon, and lots of other
variables and the particular circumstances of each nation are important. This is
also characteristic of the factors which are closely related to soft power, a nation's
ability to attract and persuade others. Opinions are really a snapshot of people's
orientations at a specific moment in time.
Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and a number of others have shown that soft power
is also highly situational. 3 While acknowledging the influence of other factors that
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contribute to anti-Americanism and the decline in soft power, Nye's perspective
concurs with the observation of Australian foreign policy commentator Paul Kelly
that:
[TJhe lesson of Iraq is that the US's soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having
failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two
consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment. lifting terrorist recruitment; and a
higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort.4
Besides the loss of soft power to influence the situation in Iraq, the growing antiAmericanism and deterioration in opinions of the United States will influence our
soft power in other contests as well. For instance, recent research on human rights
shows that majorities in such allied nations as Great Britain and Germany no longer see the United States as an effective advocate of human rights. s Without entering into details, it is not surprising to hear corridor concerns and read blogger
speculation about declining US soft power as a contributor to such differing foreign policy problems as cooperation in managing nuclear confrontations with Iran
and North Korea, the improvement of multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Darfur, or even the advancement of America's trade agenda.
This forum is not the place for a full exegesis of the way in which public diplomacy, strategic communications and propaganda are intertwined in wielding soft
power. The broad tendencies ofinterest here and the degree of consensus about the
interconnectivity among them was manifest in the use of a common frame of reference for our conference discussions provided in a timely article by Linda Robinson.6 In that article, Robinson describes a visit Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld made to the Army War College in March 2003 in which he lumped all
these concepts into a broad "war of ideas" in which he believes America is doing a
very poor job: "If I were grading,l would say we probably deserve a D or 0 plus as a
country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the
world today.... " 7
Not surprisingly, Secretary Rumsfe1d has followed up his expression of concern with some specific actions to study and improve the strategic communications morass in which America has been entrapped for several years. In this regard, his reaction has been concrete and definitely action oriented because of his
executive authority, but the realizations that prompted his action are not dissimilar to the concerns that motivated the production of over thirty studies and recommendations within the US government over the last few years to address the
problem of public diplomacy. Nor indeed has DoD been alone in trying to deal
with the issue. In fact, prior to the recent actions in DoD, much of the effort had
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been concentrated at DoS through the appointment of high proftle individuals to
take charge of the public diplomacy effort. Prominent advertising executive
Charlotte Beers was appointed under secretary for public diplomacy and public
affairs in December 2002. She was followed by former State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler, and then after a two-and-a-half-year vacancy, the president called on his campaign and White House communications adviser Karen
Hughes to take the job and launch yet another refonn effort in the fall of 2005.
In 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed some important new initiatives, many of
which will only get under way as this volume is being published. Despite the good
intentions of aU those involved (and in which the author was also personally engaged until July 2005), the hypothesis that in forms this analysis is that the new strategic communications effort in DoD may, as we have seen to a certain degree with
the increasing efforts and new leadership at DoS, actually be prelude to further
worsening of the US image and a greater loss of soft power. It may even be possible
that the increasing effort in strategic communications at DoD will actually aggravateand further spread and deepen America's soft power problem. As suggested by
the Pew study in 2002,S the fundamental problem is one of policy. This analysis
takes that idea a step further by demonstrating that a fundamental part of the policy problem centers on the increasing visibility and ubiquity of the military in
America's global communications. Indeed, this may be increasingly at the root of
America's loss of soft power as we shall see later.9
Audience M ay Be as Crucial as the Message

As mentioned previously, policy is the crucial issue for the deterioration in opinions of America and American soft power. 10 Yet strategic communications plays an
important role, and despite the increasing overall effort put forth by the United
States, a good deal of the effort may even be counterproductive. One of the key
problems is simply an inattention to audiences or attention to the wrong audiences, especially at the highest levels of government. Implicitly, the US Executive
Branch and Congress appear to have decided that they don't care about the opinion of most of the English-speaking world and traditional American allies in Western Europe. Congress has pushed for, and the Executive has complied with, the
drastic reductions of public diplomacy spending, cut back or transferred out personnel, and curtailed the broadcasting of the Voice of America to countries that
have been traditional friends and allies. Not surprisingly, opinions of the United
States have declined markedly in most of these countries. Expanding private-sector
communications, increasing tourism and trade, and even the popularity of
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American films and TV shows obviously does nothing to stem nor reverse this increasing trend.
The private sector has, however, helped us understand and become more aware
of just how bad the opinion trends are because they have learned, especially from
the once path-breaking work on global public opinion performed by the United
States Information Agency (USIA), that tracking what people think around the
world is important. The OfficeofIntelligence and Research (lNR) in DoS inherited
this tradition, and it continues to do technically respected, policy relevant research,
but not much ofit in comparison to yesteryear. II Today, there is a lot more publicly
available data in the private sector on how German or Italian or Spanish or Latin
American attitudes toward the United States are changing, so at least we do have a
broad sense of what's happening.I2
The problem for policy is that these private studies provide only a tiny window
on the broad trend in audience opinions. The research needed for the formulation
of a communications strategy is much more complicated and expensive. INR still
does some of this research, but rather than showing the way to the private sector,
the work that INR does now on DoS's global audiences is just a fragment of what is
done for most international private-sector marketing campaigns or in presidential
elections in many countries. Candidates for governor or senator in most states
have far more research resources available for shaping their campaigns than do US
embassies in important posts over a two- or three-year span. Most of the studies
about improving public diplomacy place a lot of emphasis on the need fo r more
public opinion and other types of audience research, but overall funding for research has increased only incrementally over the last few years. The funds that are
available have been concentrated much more on the Middle East and a few other
priority regions and, even with the increases, the overall effort and systematic attention to audiences in the US government has declined greatly since the Cold War
began to wind down.
The audience problem has also become more complicated because of changing
technology. Without entering into detail, it has to be recognized that speeches delivered by the president and other high administration officials are often intended
more for a domestic audience than overseas pUblics. However, words intended to
arouse patriotism in the United States often have different, if not always opposite,
effects overseas, but virtually any speech or op-ed piece or other public position
taken by senior American officials is often disseminated more widely outside the
United States than in and is readily available for hostile exploitation. For many in
the Middle East, the "war of ideas" to which many US officials have made reference
has been misunderstood, and partly because it has been wickedly portrayed, as a
confrontation with Islam itself. In the context of a war on terrorism in which the
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supportofforeign publics is vital, the need for more cautious and restrained rhetoric at home is obvious.
Technology complicates the issue further, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan
where the United States has suddenly opened the doors, not just to freedom, but to
a media diversity that those people have never before experienced. Saddam
Hussein used nearly universal access to terrestrial TV broadcasts, while repressing
radio, satellite TV, computer/Internet and every other form of media access, to
dummy down and shape the information that people had in his "brave new
world." The freedom provided by the United States after the invasion included a
sudden explosion of exposure to information and the right to opine that the Iraqis
love, as shown by the meteoric spread in the use of satellite TV and their high participation rates in polls and election turnout. Whenever even a few hours of electricity could be had, the availability of inexpensive satellite dishes also brought
Arab, Iranian and lots of other new media sources. Afghanistan also opened up
dramatically in comparison with the past, albeit the geographic, economic and
other limitations are much more severe than in Iraq so the opening has not been
nearly as pervasive.
Still another dimension, and in the long run in Iraq and Afghanistan perhaps the
most serious of the audience problems, is that insurgents intermingle with other
groups of people ranging from the actual supporters of enemy combatants to sympathizers with the United States. In these nations and those on the margin of every confli ct, DoS and elements of DoD are separately engaged, have different missions and
separately conduct political communications operations in the same arena and address overlapping populations. This is m uch less a problem of DoS than it is for
DoD and our military units in the field because the nature of the DoS message is, in
fact, public d iplomacy. The intention is to be persuasive, arouse sympathy, create
goodwill and so on. For military units, much of the time, the purpose of the unit's
presence is combat or combat support or force protection. All these missions, by
their nature and before there is an y communications per se, at least partially convey
a message of potential threat and danger. By early 2004, polls in Iraq consistently
showed that most Iraqi people did not want the United States to withdraw forces because of their fear of anarchy, but they also didn't want them anywhere nearby because of the danger of those forces being targeted or engaging in combat.
This paper cannot do more than raise a serious concern about the audience issue in combat zones, but experience in Iraq also suggested that we may not have
paid as close attention to the importance of not contaminating messages to the
noncombatant population with those actually intended for the enemy. Discussions
with officers involved in information operations in Iraq first raised this question,
especially when hostilities became particularly widespread or prolonged in a given
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area. After all, at both the practical level and conceptually, in a combat zone, the
overriding mission of the armed forces is the application of force to subdue the enemy, not win hearts and minds. U
Evidence for the difficulty of separating out this condition conceptually is fairly
common in the military literature and suggests that operationally the difficuJty
wouJd be much greater. For instance, a thoughtful article by William Darley on the
application of Von Clausewitz's traditionaJ war theory to information operations
fails to distinguish at all between the mission of compelling an enemy and the
problem of that enemy being in the midst ofa popuJation that we seek to make our
friends. lbat is, in writing about examples related to Desert Storm where the
United States was and departed as an invading force, he fails to mention the all pervasive distinction of our having become an occupying power trying to befriend the
Iraqi people as we are during Operation lraqi Freedom. 14 In another far more complex study that centers on information operations during the 2004 combat that
raged in Fallujah, the authors pay more attention, and rightly so, to enemy information operations. IS Yet, the study lacks as careful attention to the actual engagement of
the audience both before and after the attack, thus implying that the deterioration of
Iraqi opinion afterwards was largely due to the success of enemy infonnation operations. However, given the predisposition of the Iraqi people toward intensive combat
operations of the sort launched in Fallujah, opinion may have declined even without
the enemy's apparently successfuJ infonnation operations.
Legal issues in the national security arena raise particularly thorny problems for
strategic communications because of their complexity. Here the chief audience
consideration centers on the capacity of the audience to comprehend the issue in
comparison with the likelihood that a few simplistic images will totally dominate
the perceptions and conclusions of the mass public and most other audiences. The
debate over whether adherence to the Geneva Conventions should be included in
the US military code of conduct or the treatment of detainees is a perfect example.
Certainly lawyers and political leaders may perceive ambiguity in the text of the
Geneva Conventions, but what most people understand is simply that the Geneva
Conventions have symbolized a globally accepted minimal standard of conduct in
war for generations.

Getting On the Same Page Counts Less Than Whose Page We Are On
Rear AdmiraJ Thorp initiated this panel with an articuJate ana1ysis of the importance of "process" for strategic communications in order to keep all the elements of
an organization in hannony with respect to "a good policy." He emphasized the
importance of consistency in policy and actions and the extraordinary difficulty of
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accomplishing this in the context of national security, public diplomacy and international relations, thereby going beyond the natural emphasis of his remarks on
developing a "culture of communications" within DoD. In my view that approach
is analogous to the problem of ensuring that all the elements of an organization are
on the same page, and I would agree with that approach for a single, even very complex organization, such as DoD. However, I think it falls short ofthe nature of the
interrelatedness required for our national strategic communications and the relationship of DoD to the national undertaking. 16
For the strategic communications of the United States to function properly in
advancing our national interests, especially in the soft power arena, the policy and
actions of at least our most visible national organizations and disparate actors must
be understood "to converge" on a single purpose. In the myriad reports related to
America's public diplomacy problem, this concern has generally been related to
the need to integrate the public diplomacy effort with the executive leadership for
foreign policy. For instance, in a Defense Science Board report, this is described as
"leadership from the top":
A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only
White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can
bring about the sweeping refonns that are required.
Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national
security objectives more powerfully than the President's statements and actions, and
those of senior officials. 17

In another excellent analysis and proposal by the Public Diplomacy Council
about what needs to be done, the stress is more on the institutional connections to
the presidency that are needed. Two of the five major recommendations-numbers one and four-that are advanced focus on this concern:
1. Establish an agency within the Department of State and the National Security
Council process. the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD), to manage the
U.S. government's civilian information and exchanges functions and to coordinate
all U.S. government public diplomacy efforts . .

4. Establish by Presidential Directive an Interagency Committee on Public
Diplomacy at the Cabinet Level to coordinate and direct the national public
diplomacy strategy. with a permanent secretariat and associated working groups. cochaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communication and the
Director of the new USAPD Agency.18
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The concern here could also be understood as one of process if that involves making sure that the entire US government strategic communications effort converges
on the direction that the president, and through him, the National Security Council
and its key components provide for the comprehensive enterprise. 19 However, the
American experience since the start of the US effort to respond in earnest to the September I I terrorist attacks suggests that a still broader definition of convergence is
needed. One of the remarkable consequences of those attacks was the sense of global
empathy that they evoked. In an obvious allusion to President Kennedy's quip to the
beleaguered people of Berlin, Paris' I.e Monde showed just how strong the feelings
were around the world in its September 12 headline, "we are all Americans!" Yet not
long after the Bush Administration began to prosecute the war on terrorism and to
hunt the perpetrators of the attacks, opinion of the United States began to decline.
Although there may have been widespread sympathy for the United States, it
also appears that there were some definite expectations about how the United
States would conduct the war on terrorism that were rapidly frustrated, and that
this type offrustration definitely escalated and spread antipathy. Accordingly, convergence in strategic communications needs to be concerned with more than simply getting all the messages on the same page as the president's, but fo r these to have a
favorable impact they must also be in harmony with people's expectations about
those producing them. Thus it is not just that the messages from the White House
and DoS and DoD need to be consistent with those from the presidency, as that
these all need to harmonize with people's expectations about the actions and values
that America represents. Convergence, then, speaks to the coincidence between
message and behavior in order to enable strategic communications to achieve the
persuasive capacity or provide the desirable model that creates soft power.20
Many early frustrations about the US conduct of the war on terror came most
vividly and boisterously from Muslim nations and Muslim people living in the
West as a result of the sudden dramatic increase in security operations in which
the negative profile always involved them. The characteristics of the September 11
terrorists suddenly intruded on the lives of tens of thousands of students,
businesspeople, international travelers and immigrants, and, despite the overwhelming sympathy of most of these people for prosecuting the war on terrorism,
it suddenly called into question the sincerity of the US commitment to respect
human and civil rights, as well as religious and ethnic tolerance.
Gradually, a series of other actions by the United States further contradicted values that the United States was expected to honor and advance in the world arena.
For instance, the open questioning by senior US officials about the applicability of
the protections under the Geneva Conventions long before actual revelations
about abuses was not expected. After all, the United States had already been the
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overwhelming global military power for the better part of a generation, so if the
Geneva Conventions did not apply to the United States, then why should they apply
to anyone. The recent harsh rejection by the Bush Administration of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was quickly linked to the questioning of the Geneva
Conventions as a sign that the United States was putting itself above the law after
having represented itself as one of the leading advocates ofintemational law for over
fifty years.
Despite the fact that it was under the Clinton Administration that the United
States had opted out of joining both the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC after taking
part in their negotiation, the way the Bush Administration opted to harden the US
position seemed to represent a sudden increase in US unilateralism, and that increased resentment. Since the United States was viewed as the supreme power of
the era, it appeared to be rebuffing its global responsibilities and undennining foreign perceptions of institutions that provided for the common good. 2 ! Anyone can
Google "truth President Bush" and immediately find harsh, partisan criticisms of the
president that may not, however, be recognized as partisan by outside obselVers.22
Once the war in Iraq got under way, this pattern of perceptions in foreign audiences was repeatedly reaffirmed by events which seemed to constitute prima facie
contradictions of the US assertion of lawfulness in the conduct of the war against
terrorism. Media stories appeared all over the world about ambiguity in rules of
engagement in combat and how individual troops interpreted them or said they
were taught to interpret them.2J The revelation of the abuses of Abu Ghraib prisoners was just the most sensational of a series of cases in which US troops were
brought up on charges of misconduct and while that perhaps should have been expected, the majority of the Iraqi people reacted with surprise and disappointment
that American troops had proven just as fallible as any others might be. Finally, the
long-running saga of Guantanamo scandals, court reversals of government practices, and the Administration's widely lampooned discussion of alternative procedures and other euphemisms for torture communicated a sense of American
disdain for the protections of the Geneva Conventions. Rather than converging to
demonstrate the consistency of American behavior with the rhetoric we projected,
whatever consistency there may have been in our messages was being completely
overwhelmed by contradictions in our performance. 24

When Resources Matter
Nearly all the major reports on fixing public d iplomacy call for major increases in
the allocations available for DoS and for the functions that used to be performed by
USIA. The Defense Science Board Report calls for the current resources (both
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funding and personnel) of DoS to be tripled,25 but neglects the subject of additional
resource needs of DoD to support strategic communications almost entirely. The
Public Diplomacy Council recommends a 300-percent increase in personnel and a
four-fold increase in program budgets over a five-year period.26
Such reports directly attribute the loss of the US voice and the declining public
image around the world to a decline in funding, pointing out how despite the success during the Cold War there was a subsequent pattern of neglect. 27 Certainly, the
constantly declining overall resource base and the constraint it placed on public diplomacy activities was a major consideration at every stage of my career experience
in the field . On the other hand, organization, coordination and technique seem to
have been the more important issues for DoD and the work of its professionals in
the field of strategic communications. And while my personal experience in direct
discussion of strategic communications with DoD and military colleagues was
largely limited to four years of service in Italy during the Balkans conflicts and on
other theater-wide issues that promoted extensive collaboration and during the
last few years in Iraq and Washington, DC, I don't recall that declining resources
was ever a major concern of theirs.
Of course, part of the answer for this difference in perspective may be attributable simply to the fact that the DoD budget is dozens of multiples of the size of the
foreign affairs budget, before even counting the costs ofIraq and Afghanistan. 28 Indeed, the order of magnitude of the difference in resource availability probably has
a great deal to do with the reasons that a sophomoric mistake could be made in
DoD to enable the Lincoln Group to pay journalists in Iraq for writing friendly stories, thereby undermining the credibility of any favorable information that might
appear. 29 And during the days of the Coalition Provisional Authority when resources were carefully husbanded for public diplomacy operations per se, a British
production company could be paid millions of dollars out of military funds to run
vague, feel-good-about-democracy advertisements on Iraqi television. 30
The tendency to confuse strategic communications with advertising may be in
part responsible for the tendency in the US government to fund DoD strategic communications relatively lavishly in comparison with the starvation diet fo r public diplomacy.3l Every member of Congress understands how expensive media
advertising can be and vaguely recognizes that DoS does not engage in that activity
because the broadcasting function was handed off to the Broadcasting Board of Go vemors when USIA was merged into DoS. Moreover, additional ad hoc funding goes
to DoD for direct support of military operations. All this means that strategic communications becomes the umbrella for consideration of resource allocations and
moves all the further from public diplomacy. Yet it also means that the broader concerns of public diplomacy and its practitioners will be harder to integrate into the
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frameworks for orienting and controlling strategic communications. Practically
speaking, this also explains why there were no public diplomacy specialists in the
direct chain of command over the "feel good" advertising in Iraq.
More basic than the focus on strategic communications is the problem of
whether it is the strategic communications or the public diplomacy effort that actually breeds the soft power. With a few exceptions, I think that this point is often
lost because of the failure to understand the fundamental difference between the
way soft power is developed and used. Strategic communications tends to be considered within the context of the achievement of a relatively specific government
objective, while public diplomacy includes such communications but places them
in the context of the broader relationship of societal trust, empathy and, hopefully,
admiration.3 2 Since a broader objective and a non -specific time frame are also involved in public diplomacy, this makes it harder for the government to fund it as
part of the traditional annual appropriations process.
Thus, the budgetary process disfavors the needed funding of public diplomacy,
but in doing so, it may also prejudice strategic communications, or help explain
why the Bush Administration drive is still not bearing fruit. That is, I think it reasonable to hypothesize that many, and certainly some of the more important, strategic communications objectives require the existence of a somewhat favorable
climate of opinion for the messages to be credible and effective. Accordingly, the
neglect for the longer-term public diplomacy effort may doom even a very intense
strategic communications campaign.

Undennining the Credibility of the Military as Messenger
The Bush administration's conduct of the war against terrorism has given rise to an
increasing chorus of concern about the militarization of US foreign policy over the
last few years. Of course, some of the most articulate voices, such as Chalmers
Johnson 's, had begun to raise concerns and link them to historic arguments, especially about American imperialism, and how the conduct of American policy had
been associated with antipathy toward America in a given region, especially East
Asia and the Philippines. in response to specific actions, such as the expansion of
the Vietnam con flict, even before the September I I attacks. 33 Johnson pursues his
basic argument and expands it in the light of developments in the war on
terrorism.u and Andrew Bacevich provides a broader focus on military history to
develop parallel concerns focused on the Middle EaSt. 35 The problem in Johnson's
view is that
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[sllowly but surely the Department of Defense is obscuring and displacing the
Department of State as the primary agency for making and administering foreign
policy. We now station innumerably more uniformed officers than civilian diplomats,
aid workers, or environmental specialists in foreign countries--a point not lost on the
lands to which they are assigned. Our garrisons send a daily message that the United
States prefers to deal with other nations through the use or threat of force rather than
negotiations, commerce, or cultural interaction and through military-to-military, not
civilian- to-civilian, relations. 36

While the militarization of policy may be responsible for the deterioration of
the US image, it is not something for which the military bears direct responsibility
or can even ftx. 37 The problem is akin to that which each military unit now faces
when they enter the field in I raq. Most Iraqis fear having any contact with or even
being in the vicinity of the US military, not because they have personally had a
bad experience, but because they are aware that Americans are the targets of attacks that are dangerous to anyone near them and that the response to attacks has
led to great damage in the surrounding areas, whether intentional or not. Indeed,
the crux of the US problem, at least for the war on terrorism, may be in the strategy that the United States elected for pursuing the war on terrorism. That is, in
the decision to justify the preemptive use of force for defending American
interests.
President Bush's speech at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002, provided the first public exposition and justification
for the use of preemptive military fo rce by the United States against Saddam
H ussein's regime in Iraq. That speech unleashed a wave o f global controversy
and debate because the US position seemed to hark back to a classical legitimating of war that was supposed to have been superseded by the creation of the
United Nations collective security system. Within a few days, the Congressional
Research SelVice, much better known fo r the quality than the celerity o f its
work, issued a report stating that "the historical record indicates that the United
States has never, to date, engaged in a ' preemptive' military attack against another
nation."38
Yet on September 19, 2002, the preemptive use of military force was incorporated as a cornerstone of the US national security strategy and the war on terrorism
and thereby set the stage for the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite
the initial military success in Iraq, the reaction of much of the international community continued to worsen and harden despite any justification by the United
States about the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction or links to terrorist organizations that had attacked the United States. Not only were the ethics of
the US position questioned, but the gradual debunking of every rationale for the
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attack except the spread of democracy further weakened the preemptive doctrine. 39 According to foreign policy analyst Julia Sweig, the US loss of global respect
was due to the imposition of US hegemony on the world community in the way
that it had long exercised power in Latin America.
It had been one thing for the global powers that once held a stake in the region to yield
grudgingly to U.S. hegemony with the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth and
twe ntieth centuries. But it was quite another for the United States to subj«t the entire
world community- including fo rmer and aspiring world powers---to the fast-and loose approach to diplomacy, military intervention, sovereignty, and international law
that had long been the U.S. currency in America's regional sphere of influence. 40

Other commen tators have emphasized graver problems than the unilateralism and
arrogance represented by the US action. Stanley Hoffman comments o n how several international analysts link the preemptive strike doctrine to the deterioration
of a sense of in ternational order and cites a commentary on the US national security strategy by Henry Kissinger to that effect: "if each nation claims that righ t to
define its preemptive rights, the absence of any rules could spell international
chaos. "41 More to the point for this analysis, British commentator David Mepham
notes how the negative impact of the loss of US credibility directly undermines
public trust in the United States and actually increases the sense of insecurity in the
global community that the United States is supposedly making safer. 42

ConciU5ion
The discussion of the first three areas of strategic communications practices discussed in this analysis was made in the spirit of offering experience-based suggestions for improving foreign opinions of the United States and supporting better
achievement of policy objectives. For instance, a more explicit focus on the nature
of the understanding that an audience b rings to an issue should p rovide the framework for shaping of messages for it, especially given the complexity oflegal issues
and lawyerly discourse. However, the observation that these practices tend to be
building upon one another is in tended to suggest how limited the prospects may
actually be for improvement in an y area to make a difference for the soft power
trend overall. That is, simply transferring resources from the strategic communications effort in DoD to the public diplomacy work of DoS probably won't begin to
reverse the negative trend. The crucial consideration now probably relates to the
way the world has come to consider the exercise of power by the United States. Until we show that we are less inclined to rely on the use of our military or the use of
preemptive military force in the face of strategic frustrations, the improvemen t in
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our strategic communications craft will not actually serve to mcrease US soft
power or to improve our long-term ability to advance our interests.
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